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For the Least of These Br other s and Sister s of
Mine: Pr oviding Mental Health Car e to
Undocumented Immigr ant Childr en
Patrick D. Murphree∗
“But I wasn’t sure I wanted to come. I decided for sure only when
the gang threatened me.” —Maritza, age 15.1
Imagine being 10 years old, leaving the only home you have ever known
in the company of a stranger to be taken to reunite with a mother you barely
know. Imagine being shuffled from bus to train, packed in with throngs of
other immigrants making the perilous passage north through Mexico to the
United States border. Imagine your cell phone, your only link to your
family, being thrown away by the stranger to reduce the risk of being
tracked. Then imagine being left a half mile from the border and told you
were on your own. Imagine climbing a fence, running into Border
Protection, and being so frightened that all you can do is repeat your
mother’s phone number. Imagine doing all of this because criminal gangs
target boys your age for recruitment.2 Children may be resilient, but the
∗
I would like to thank Jennifer Coco and Sara Godchaux of the Southern Poverty Law
Center in New Orleans for the initial suggestion from which this Article germinated and
Professors Davida Finger and Hiroko Kusuda of Loyola University New Orleans for their
advice on earlier versions.
1
REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE UNITED STATES & THE CARIBBEAN, UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN ON THE RUN: UNACCOMPANIED
CHILDREN LEAVING CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 6 [hereinafter CHILDREN ON THE RUN],
http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/1_UAC_Children%20on%20the%20
Run_Full%20Report.pdf.
2
This paragraph is based on the story of Alex, a 10-year-old El Salvadorian child. Eli
Saslow, A Ten-Year Old Immigrant Faces Risks, Doubts on the Journey to Reunite with
His Mother, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-
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trauma of such a journey under these circumstances is likely to leave lasting
psychic scars. Unfortunately, this little boy is not alone.
Without appropriate mental health care, the scars of the migration
experience may permanently disfigure a child’s life. Regardless of
documented status, immigrant children have a right to mental healthcare.
Further, the provision of this care benefits not only these children but also
the society of which they are a part, since their ability to contribute to
society as productive adults could be inhibited by the presence of
unaddressed trauma.3 To address this potentially debilitating mental trauma,
eligibility for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Program (CHIP) should
be expanded to include low-income undocumented youth.4
This article will first examine the recent “surge” of unaccompanied
children migrating to the United States, exploring the causes of this “surge,”
10-year-old-immigrant-faces-risks-doubts-on-the-journey-to-reunite-with-hismother/2014/09/07/169f16d6-3213-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html.
3
See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
4
While a number of student notes and comments have addressed providing health care
to undocumented immigrants through Medicaid and other programs, these works have
not addressed mental health needs specifically. See generally Jayne Bart-Plange,
Comment, Equal Protection Violations: An Asylum-Seeker’s Right to Medicaid Benefits
and Primary Health Care, 83 UMKC L. REV. 207 (2014); Elizabeth R. Cesler, Note,
Denying Undocumented Immigrants Access to Medicaid: A Denial of their Equal
Protection Rights?, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255 (2008); Cindy Chang, Note, Health Care
for Undocumented Immigrant Children: Special Members of an Underclass, 83 WASH U.
L.Q. 1271 (2005); David J. Deterding, Note, A Deference-Based Dilemma: The
Implications of Lewis v. Thompson for Access to Non-Emergency Health Benefits for
Undocumented Alien Children, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 951 (2008); Akeisha R. Gilcrist,
Undocumented Immigrants: Lack of Equal Protection and Its Impact on Public Health,
34 J. LEGAL MED. 403 (2013); Ryan Knutsona, Note, Deprivation of Care: Are Federal
Laws Restricting the Provision of Medical Care to Immigrants Working as Planned?, 28
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 401 (2008); Jeffery A. Needelman, Note, Attacking Federal
Restrictions on Noncitizens’ Access to Public Benefits on Constitutional Grounds: A
Survey of Relevant Doctrines, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 349 (1997); Alexander Vivero Neill,
Comment, Human Rights Don’t Stop at the Border: Why Texas Should Provide
Preventative Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants, 4 SCHOLAR 405 (2002);
Hyejung Janet Shina, Note, All Children Are Not Created Equal: PRWORA’s
Unconstitutional Restriction on Immigrant Children’s Access to Federal Health Care
Programs, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 484 (2006).
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children’s experiences on their journeys, and what happens once they arrive
in the United States. The article next addresses these children’s mental
health needs and the fiscal and human costs of failing to address them
before advocating for expanding the eligibility criteria for Medicaid and
CHIP. After briefly examining the history and structure of these programs,
the remainder of the article presents constitutional and policy arguments for
removing the ban on providing these program’s benefits to children who are
in the country without authorization.5

I. THE SURGE IN UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN ARRIVING AT THE USMEXICO BORDER
In

fiscal

year

2014,

border

patrol

apprehended

over

68,000

unaccompanied children, a 76 percent increase over the previous year6 and a
269 percent increase since fiscal year 2010.7 Apprehensions of families with
5
While there is significant literature on the need to expand access to health care for
noncitizens in the United States, see, e.g., Jennifer Y. Seo, Justice Not for All: Challenges
to Obtaining Equal Access to Health Care for Non-Citizen Immigrants in the United
States, 3 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 143 (2011) (analyzing the issue
through the lens of the experience of the Asian-American community), the mental health
needs of undocumented immigrants often become a side issue within that larger
discussion, see, e.g., id. at 146-47, 153-54, 159, 161-63.
6
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CBP BORDER
SECURITY REPORT 1 (2014),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FINAL%20Draft%20CBP%20FY14%
20Report_20141218.pdf.
7
U.S. Border Patrol, Total Unaccompanied Alien Children (0-17) Apprehensions by
Month, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION 1, 5,
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20UACs%
20by%20Sector,%20FY10.-FY14.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). The most recent data
for fiscal year 2015 indicates that the “surge” may be slowing with a 42 percent decline
in apprehensions of unaccompanied children and of individuals traveling with a family
unit. See U.S. Border Patrol, Southwest Border Sectors, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Southwest%20Border%20Famil
y%20Units%20and%20UAC%20Apps%20-%20FY14-FY15.pdf (last visited Nov. 23,
2015). Additionally, although fiscal year 2015 suggested that the “surge” may have
ended, id. at 6, the most recent data indicates that the apprehension rate may be rising
again, United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied
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children have also increased, adding to the number of children potentially in
need of care.8 Additionally, the demographics of this migrant population
have changed. Until 2013, children from Mexico constituted the majority of
the unaccompanied children entering the United States, but since that time
the majority of these children have been fleeing Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala (the so-called Northern Triangle).9 Although the rate of
unaccompanied children arriving in the United States has declined
somewhat since peaking in 2014, it nevertheless remains higher than before
the beginning of the surge.10
A. Factors Driving the Surge
The causes of any child’s migration to the United States are as individual
as the child herself, but observers and academics have isolated several
common explanations.11 One strand, emblematized by a recent study from
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, emphasizes social
factors: “entrenched poverty, an escalating threat posed by drug trafficking,
polarized political systems, weak law enforcement and social hardships—

Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. Customs & Border Protection
[hereinafter Apprehensions], http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-borderunaccompanied-children/fy-2016/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016) (showing 48,311
apprehensions for the first 10 months of fiscal year 2016 compared to 39,970
apprehensions for the whole of fiscal year 2015). Regardless of whether the rate is
slowing or not, even the slower 2015 rate is still significantly higher than the rate in 2010,
and the children already present in the United States as a result of migrations during the
“surge” still require access to mental health care.
8
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting a 356 percent
increase in apprehensions of families since fiscal year 2013).
9
Apprehensions, supra note 7.
10
See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED
ALIEN CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW 2 tbl.1 (2016),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf (reporting numbers of unaccompanied
children apprehended at the Southwestern border through the first half of fiscal year
2016).
11
See generally Scott Rempell, Credible Fears, Unaccompanied Minors, and the Causes
of the Southwestern Border Surge, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 337 (2015).
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such as poverty and unemployment.”12 Additionally, the rise of powerful
and brutal gangs has forced many children to either join a gang or become
victims of violent recruitment pressure;13 these gangs have driven murder
rates in Northern Triangle countries to astronomical heights.14 Children
cannot even escape this violence at home, as evidence shows domestic
violence is also rising.15 Thus, it should come as little surprise that in one
study 48 percent of unaccompanied children cited gang violence as a
motivation for their migration to the United States, and 21 percent
mentioned domestic violence.16
For other children, more personal factors account for the choice to
migrate. Some children have simply been abandoned by their parents or
guardians and see no reason to stay in their country of origin.17 On the other
hand, some make the journey to reunite with family members who have
already migrated to the United States.18 In the latter case, there may be a
12

CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note 1, at 24.
Rempell, supra note 11, at 361. In Mexico, children also face pressure to become part
of smuggling gangs. See CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note 1, at 6 (reporting that 38
percent of unaccompanied children from Mexico who were interviewed for the study
reported this pressure).
14
Dennis Stinchcomb & Eric Hershberg, Unaccompanied Migrant Children from
Central America: Context, Causes, and Responses 17-18 (Ctr. for Latin Am. & Latino
Stud., Working Paper No. 7, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=2524001. The three Northern
Triangle countries are Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. For a brief introduction to
the violence in the region, see Danielle Renwick, Central America’s Violent Northern
Triangle, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/transnationalcrime/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle/p37286.
15
Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 14, at 17-18.
16
See CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note 1, at 6.
17
Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 14, at 22-23; CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note
1, at 33.
18
See CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note 1, at 31-37; see also Carola Suárez-Orozco et
al., Growing Up in the Shadows: The Developmental Implications of Unauthorized
Status, HARV. EDUC. REV. 438, 442 (2011) (noting that some parents’ decision to bring
their children to the United States without authorization may stem from frustration with
slow-moving bureaucratic systems and “the realization that they are missing their
children’s childhood”); Saslow, supra note 2 (describing the journey of a 10-year-old boy
from El Salvador to join his mother in Los Angeles).
13

VOLUME 15 • ISSUE 1 • 2016

69

70

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

mix of motives: familial sentiment along with a desire to escape raging
violence.
Finally, some commentators have suggested that increased awareness of
changes in US immigration policy, spread through word-of-mouth, may
account for the surge.19 In a nuanced version of this argument, Professor
Scott Rempel acknowledges a contributing role for deteriorating
circumstances within countries of origin but concludes that beliefs inspired
by new US policies are the main driving force.20 According to Professor
Rempel, smugglers may be misrepresenting the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 in order to entice people to use their
services to send their children to the United States.21 Additionally, the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program22 may play a role

19

See, e.g., Rempell, supra note 11, at 381-83.
Id.
21
Id. For examples of recent legislation embodying changes in United States
immigration policy, see Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L.
No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54; William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044.
22
The DACA program grants employment authorization to immigrants under age 31, as
of the effective date of the policy, who came to the United States when they were under
16 and who meet specified criteria, including continuous residence for five years, lack of
serious or numerous convictions, and attaining a high school diploma or GED or
receiving an honorable discharge from the armed forces. For more detailed breakdowns
of DACA’s requirements and benefits, see Consideration of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivalsdaca (last updated Aug. 10, 2016); DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals),
IMMIGR. EQUALITY, http://www.immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/our-legalresources/path-to-status-in-the-u-s/daca-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals/ (last
visited Nov. 3, 2015). The program has been controversial for, among other things,
having been established by the executive branch rather than Congress. See Memorandum
from Janet Napolitano, Sec. of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting
Commissioner, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Alejandro Mayorkas, Director, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Services, & John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement (June 15, 2012), http://dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercisingprosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (characterizing
DACA as merely an exercise of prosecutorial discretion to not deport certain deportable
persons).
20
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through either an inaccurate belief that it will apply to unaccompanied
children or a belief that it signals a new direction for US immigration
policy.23
B. The Traumas of the Migration Experience
After a child has decided to migrate (or had that decision made for him or
her), the child must still cross hundreds or thousands of dangerous and
potentially traumatic miles to reach the United States. Although the freight
train route known as “La Bestia” is famous as a means for Central
American migrants to move through Mexico,24 75 to 80 percent of children
migrate with the aid of smugglers,25 typically by van or bus.26 This system
avoids some of the physical dangers of the rail journey, but children still
risk extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, and forced disappearance27
because their routes north are controlled by drug and trafficking gangs.28
Girls travelling alone face additional dangers of sexual assault and forced
prostitution.29 Up to 80 percent of women and girls who make the migration
endure a sexual assault along the way.30 To overcome these risks and reduce
23

Rempell, supra note 11, at 381-83.
See Rodrigo Dominguez Villegas, Central American Migrants and “La Bestia”: The
Route, Dangers, and Government Responses, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Sept. 10,
2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-migrants-and-la-bestiaroute-dangers-and-government-responses.
25
Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 14, at 12; see also Camilo Vargas, Coyotes: The
Smugglers that Bring Kids to the Border, LATINO USA (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://latinousa.org/2014/09/12/smugglers/ (distinguishing between smugglers and
traffickers and explaining that smugglers are successful due to their ties to communities
in migrants’ countries of origin).
26
Villegas, supra note 24.
27
Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 14, at 8-9.
28
See Villegas, supra note 24.
29
Salil Shetty, Most Dangerous Journey: What Central American Migrants Face When
They Try to Cross the Border, AMNESTY INT’L: HUMAN RTS. NOW BLOG (Feb. 20, 2014,
12:58 PM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/americas/most-dangerous-journey-what-centralamerican-migrants-face-when-they-try-to-cross-the-border/.
30
Erin Siegal McIntyre & Deborah Bonello, Is Rape the Price to Pay for Migrant
Women Chasing the American Dream?, FUSION (Sept. 10, 2014, 5:51 PM),
http://fusion.net/story/17321/is-rape-the-price-to-pay-for-migrant-women-chasing-the24
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the chances of becoming victims, young migrants may make themselves
appear older and affect a toughness and bravura, further heightening the
psychological toll taken by the migration.31
Once apprehended in the United States by Customs and Border
Protection,

children

identified

as

unaccompanied

minors

from

noncontiguous countries are transferred to the custody of the Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR) while their immigration cases proceed.32
Because the law requires unaccompanied children to be “promptly placed in
the least restrictive setting that is in the best interests of the child,”33 the vast
majority of Central American children who have successfully migrated are
placed with a sponsor—a parent, relative, or family friend in the United
States.34 Children for whom a sponsor cannot be located are placed in long-

american-dream/ (basing this percentage on interviews with directors of migrant
shelters); see also AMNESTY INT’L, INVISIBLE VICTIMS: MIGRANTS ON THE MOVE IN
MEXICO 15 (2010), http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/amr410142010eng.pdf
(“According to some experts, the prevalence of rape is such that people smugglers may
require women to have a contraceptive injection prior to the journey as a precaution
against pregnancy resulting from rape.”); Shetty, supra note 29 (“Health officials report
that as many as six in ten migrant women and girls are raped on the journey.”).
31
See, e.g., Saslow, supra note 2 (“If there was one skill he had acquired during his long
journey, it was how to affect toughness—how to stiffen his shoulders and spike up his
wavy black hair with gel to make himself look a few inches taller and a few years
older.”).
32
Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 14, at 29. Under federal law, an
“unaccompanied alien child” is a child under 18 who “has no lawful immigration status
in the United States” and whose parents or legal guardian is either outside the United
States or inside the United States but not “available to provide care and physical
custody.” 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012). Unless they request a hearing before an
immigration judge or are eligible for refugee status, Mexican and Canadian children are
voluntarily repatriated; if they are not, they are transferred to ORR custody. Stinchcomb
& Hershberg, supra note 14, at 29.
33
8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2) (2012).
34
Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 14, at 29 (reporting that 85 percent of
unaccompanied children are placed with a sponsor); Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman,
Dramatic Surge in the Arrival of Unaccompanied Children Has Deep Roots and No
Simple Solutions, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 13, 2014),
http://migrationpolicy.org/article/dramatic-surge-arrival-unaccompanied-children-hasdeep-roots-and-no-simple-solutions (reporting 90 percent being placed with a sponsor).
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term foster care or extended-care group homes.35 While children who
remain in some form of secure care with ORR (generally children who pose
a threat to public health or safety) have access to mental health care,36
children released to sponsors may not,37 even though their need may be just
as great, particularly as they face the further challenges of living as
undocumented persons in the United States.

II. MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS AMONG UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN
In addition to trauma from the migration experience, undocumented
children have unaddressed mental health needs due to the stressors of
undocumented status and racial discrimination.38 If unmet, these needs
leave children exposed to a higher risk of lifelong disabilities.39 One in five
children in the United States will develop a severe mental disorder at some
point during his or her lifetime,40 while half of all chronic mental illness
begins by age 14.41 We should not assume that undocumented children are
35
Olga Byrne & Elise Miller, The Flow of Unaccompanied Children Through the
Immigration System: A Resource for Practitioners, Policy Makers, and Researchers,
VERA INST. JUST. 16 (Mar. 2012),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-flow-of-unaccompaniedchildren-through-the-immigration-system.pdf.
36
Id. at 14; see also Lara Yoder Nafziger, Protection or Persecution: The Detention of
Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in the United States, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 357, 370-73, 379-85 (2008) (describing the terms of the Flores settlement, which
required safe facilities and medical care for children in ORR custody as well as
encouraged release to sponsors whenever possible, but noting that in many ways the ORR
continues to fall short of the requirements in the settlement agreement).
37
Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 14, at 30 (contrasting children who remain in
ORR custody, and therefore “have immediate access to a range of services provided by a
network of ORR-funded providers” with children released to sponsors, “only a fraction of
[whom] are aware of or have access to similar services”).
38
See infra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
39
See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
40
Any Disorder Among Children, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/any-disorder-among-children.shtml
(last visited Sept. 23, 2015).
41
Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset Distributions of DSMIV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 593, 593 (2005).
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somehow exempt from these larger trends. Among a sample of Latino
adolescents—93 percent of whom were not US citizens—31 percent
displayed clinical or subclinical levels of anxiety and 18 percent exhibited
symptoms of depression.42 Indeed, as the American Academy of Pediatrics
has recognized, “the urgency of [undocumented] children’s mental health
needs is secondary only to their legal needs.”43
Although there are some genetic risk factors for mental illness,44
environmental stressors contribute significantly to its manifestation.45 Such
stressors frequently accompany the migration experience. For instance, one
meta-study of forcibly displaced children identified the following risk
factors for reduced mental health outcomes: being female, being exposed to
violence either before or after migration, migrating without adult
accompaniment, feeling discriminated against by citizens of the host
country, changing addresses multiple times in the host country, having a
parent with psychological problems, being raised in a single-parent
household, and having a parent who has been exposed to violence.46
42

KRISTA M. PERREIRA & CATINCA BUCSAN, CAROLINA POPULATION CTR., LATINO
IMMIGRANT PARENTS: ACCESSING MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR THEIR
ADOLESCENTS 1 (2008). Although this study did not separate undocumented immigrants
from immigrants more generally, see id. at 8, it is unlikely that the stress levels of
undocumented adolescents would be lower.
43
Peter Cooch & Fukuda Yasuko, Resolution: Addressing the Legal and Mental Health
Needs of Undocumented Immigrant Children, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS – CAL. CHAPTER 1
(Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.aapca1.org/sites/aapca1/files/u34/final_resolution__addressing_the_legal_and_mental_health_needs_of_undocumented_immigrant_children
.pdf. The American Academy of Pediatrics’ leadership selected this resolution as the
organization’s top priority for 2015. See Melissa Jenco, Needs of Undocumented
Children Tops AAP Annual Leadership Forum Resolution List, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS –
D.C. CHAPTER, http://www.aapdc.org/newsletter/2015.04.01.html#update8 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2015).
44
See, e.g., Five Major Mental Disorders Share Genetic Roots, NAT’L INST. MENTAL
HEALTH (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-news/2013/five-majormental-disorders-share-genetic-roots.shtml.
45
See Charles W. Schmidt, Environmental Connections: A Deeper Look into Illness, 115
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A404 (2007).
46
Mina Fazel et al., Mental Health of Displaced and Refugee Children Resettled in
High-Income Countries: Risk and Protective Factors, 379 LANCET 250, 260 tbl.4 (2012).
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While Central American children fleeing threats from murderous gangs
can aptly be described as forced migrants, even those children whose
migrations were somewhat voluntary still likely confront many of the risk
factors identified in this study. Children who migrated without their families
typically experienced high levels of poverty and violence in their countries
of origin;47 this experience is strongly correlated with poorer mental health
outcomes.48 Moreover, the migration itself is frequently a traumatic
experience—something recognized by caseworkers who provide sponsors
with

information

regarding

post-traumatic

stress

unaccompanied children into sponsors’ custody.

49

before

releasing

Sources of trauma

include sexual assault and the fear and experience of being victimized by
smugglers, gangs, or government officials.50 Children’s ambivalence about
the decision to migrate can also lower their resilience to these shocks.51
Stressors do not cease once children arrive in the United States. Children
may be “despondent about being apprehended by immigration officials.”52
Children who have been separated from their parents may have difficulty
trusting parents from whom they are estranged or by whom they feel
abandoned.53 Although poverty may be less desperate than that in their

The article also identified some protective factors: “high parental support and family
cohesion,” “self-reported support from friends,” “self-reported positive school
experience,” and “same ethnic-origin foster care.” Id.
47
See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
48
Laura Pacione et al., Int’l Ass’n for Child & Adolescent Mental Health, The Mental
Health of Children Facing Collective Adversity: Poverty, Homelessness, War, and
Displacement, in IACAPAP TEXTBOOK OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH
(Joseph M. Rey ed., 2015) (e-book), http://iacapap.org/wp-content/uploads/J.4POVERTY-072012.pdf.
49
See, e.g., Saslow, supra note 2 (describing a packet of information on post-traumatic
stress given to a parent of an unaccompanied minor by a caseworker before the minor
was released into her custody).
50
See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
51
See CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that children may have
conflicting emotions regarding their decision to migrate).
52
See id.
53
See Suárez-Orozco et al., supra note 18, at 449; Saslow, supra note 2.
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country of origin, unaccompanied children in the United States are
generally placed with parents or other family members who, as immigrants
themselves, typically have a lower income than comparably situated
nonimmigrants.54 Poor families often live in more violent, segregated, and
under-resourced

communities.55

If

the

child’s

parents

are

also

undocumented, then the fear of having his or her parents taken away can
produce a debilitating insecurity that manifests as anxiety and depression.56
If undocumented parents are detained by immigration authorities, their
children experience trauma not only as a result of the separation but also
from the financial burden inflicted by a breadwinner’s incarceration.57 If
those parents are subsequently deported, “the impact . . . is devastating to
both the physical and mental health of these children.”58 For children,

54

See Judith Gans, HOUSEHOLD INCOME, POVERTY, AND FOOD-STAMP USE IN NATIVEBORN AND IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS: A CASE STUDY IN USE OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 4
(2013) (indicating that at all income levels, immigrant household income lags behind that
of native households); see also Maria Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and
Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373,
1380-81 (2005) (discussing the particular challenges faced by children of migrants, which
include “severe poverty, inadequate housing, and ‘the stigma of being a migrant’”
(quoting Michael A. Olivas, Storytelling Out of School: Undocumented College
Residency, Race, and Reaction, 22 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1081 (1995))).
55
Suárez-Orozco et al., supra note 18, at 448.
56
See Kari Lydersen, Fear and Trauma: Undocumented Immigrants and Mental Health,
INST. FOR JUST. & JOURNALISM (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://justicejournalism.org/whiteboard/fear-trauma-uncertainty-undocumentedimmigrants-and-mental-health/; see also López, supra note 54, at 1380-81 (describing
how the fear of deportation can be exacerbated by state policies that encourage public
school employees to report undocumented youth to federal authorities); Suárez-Orozco et
al., supra note 18, at 443 (describing the “daily nightmare of knowing their parents may
be swept away any time”).
57
See Kris Anne Bonifacio, Undocumented Youth Struggle with Anxiety, Depression,
YOUTH PROJECT (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.chicago-bureau.org/undocumented-youthstruggle-with-anxiety-depression/.
58
Nikki Smith, Children’s Rights Nationally and Internationally During the Deportation
of Their Parents or Themselves: Does the Right to Sovereignty Trump the Best Interests
of the Child?, 5 CRIT 1, 36 (describing negative psychological effects of this experience,
including fear, frequent crying, withdrawal, and aggression, and how these worsen with
increased separation).
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keeping their undocumented status a secret and suppressing their native
culture produces psychological stress, while the status itself isolates
children from social rituals such as getting a driver’s license.59 If parents
attempt to shield their children from this stress, the psychological damage
caused when children suddenly discover that they themselves are
undocumented mirrors “the displacement felt by persons who had to
physically move.”60
Additionally, undocumented youth from Central America must face the
daily stress of racial discrimination,61 compounded by the “barrage of
derogatory portraits of immigrants, particularly of unauthorized immigrants,
in the media, school, and community settings.”62 Thus, for undocumented
children, particularly those who arrived unaccompanied, “the slow-burn
effects of being unauthorized in the [United States] are piled on top of the
post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental health impacts sparked by
traumatic experiences suffered in coming to the [United States].”63 Because
there is a positive correlation between the frequency of adverse experiences
and the negative health effects associated with those experiences,64 a child
59

See Suárez-Orozco et al., supra note 18, at 443-44, 453-56.
Ragini Shah, Sharing the American Dream: Towards Formalizing the Status of Longterm Resident Undocumented Children in the United States, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 637, 669-70 (2008) (“Psychiatrists, working closely with undocumented youth,
indicate a disturbing pattern of emotional difficulties that directly results from a young
person hearing the news that he lacked lawful status.”). Such deception would be
possible, for instance, if the child came to the United States when very young.
61
See, e.g., Shelly P. Harrell, A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Racism-Related
Stress: Implications for the Well-Being of People of Color, 70 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
42 (2000) (collecting studies analyzing racism-related stress); see also Sarah L. Szanton
et al., Racial Discrimination Is Associated with a Measure of Red Blood Cell Oxidative
Stress: A Potential Pathway for Racial Health Disparities, 19 INT’L J. BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH 489 (2012) (postulating a cellular pathway through which the stress of racial
discrimination can produce observed health disparities between African-American and
white populations).
62
Suárez-Orozco et al., supra note 18, at 450.
63
Lydersen, supra note 56; see generally Suárez-Orozco et al., supra note 18
(characterizing this stress as the “duress of liminality” or in-between-ness).
64
Fazel et al., supra note 46, at 279.
60
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who arrives in the United States unaccompanied likely needs mental health
support.65
All too often, this need goes unmet.66 Undocumented youth are ineligible
for Medicaid and CHIP, even if they are income-qualified.67 They typically
lack health insurance68—even children eligible for DACA are excluded
from the federal Health Insurance Marketplace and from most state
exchanges.69 In the absence of insurance or government funding, the high
cost of health care is a significant financial barrier.70 Even when money is
available, inadequate language services may prevent undocumented youth
in need from accessing care.71 Finally, fear of having a family member’s
immigration status reported by a health care provider, although a very rare

65

Suárez-Orozco et al., supra note 18, at 461 (“[T]he effects of unauthorized status on
development across the lifespan are uniformly negative, with millions of [US] children
and youth at risk of lower educational performance, economic stagnation, blocked
mobility, and ambiguous belonging. In all, the data suggest an alarming psychosocial
formation.”).
66
See Lindsay Pérez Huber, “Como Una Jaula De Oro” (It’s Like a Golden Cage): The
Impact of DACA and the California Dream Act on Undocumented Chicanas/Latinas, 39
CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 91, 122 (2015) (“Most participants identified access to
healthcare as a concern for themselves and their communities.”). As one participant in the
study noted, “a lot of our peers and colleagues were undocumented. We always knew we
were dealing with a lot of health issues from physical to mental, to just overall well-being
and we realized that we didn’t have access.” Id. at 123.
67
See infra Section III(C).
68
See Bonifacio, supra note 57.
69
Health Care and DACA Deferred Action, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR.,
http://www.nilc.org/acadacafaq.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
70
See Bonifacio, supra note 57 (noting as well the obstacle posed by waiting lists for
mental health services at local clinics).
71
PERREIRA & BUCSAN, supra note 42, at 15 (reporting that 61 percent of Latino parents
with limited English skills indicated “that it was very important that providers speak their
language”). Although the federal government has interpreted Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act as requiring a provision of services for patients with limited English proficiency,
language access continues to be spotty, particularly at non-hospital sites. See generally
Alice Hm Chen et al., The Legal Framework for Language Access in Healthcare
Settings: Title VI and Beyond, 22 (Supp.) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S362 (2007).
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occurrence, discourages some parents from seeking services for their
children.72
The consequences of leaving mental trauma unaddressed can be dire.
Because children suffering from PTSD display reduced activity in brain
areas associated with recall,73 they have lower academic performance and
an increased risk of dropping out of school.74 If left unaddressed, trauma
can develop into more serious forms of mental illness.75 Consequences of
serious mental illnesses include “high rates of chronic medical problems”76
with their associated public health and finance implications. Finally, an
undocumented child with a mental illness may make the ultimate decision
to take his or her own life—“[o]ver 90 percent of children and adolescents
who commit suicide have a mental disorder.”77 Access to necessary mental
health care reduces the risk that undocumented children will experience the
adverse effects of untreated trauma and mental illness.
72

Bonifacio, supra note 57; Shannon Fruth, Comment, Medical Repatriation: The
Intersection of Mandated Emergency Care, Immigration Consequences, and
International Obligations, 36 J. LEGAL MED. 45, 54 (2015) (“[I]llegal immigrants may
delay diagnosis and treatment of communicable diseases, due to fear of detection.”
(quoting the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services)).
73
Erin Digitale, Brain Imaging Shows Kids’ PTSD Symptoms Link Poor Hippocampus
Function in Stanford/Packard Study, STANFORD MED. (Dec. 8, 2009),
https://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2009/12/brain-imaging-shows-kids-ptsdsymptoms-linked-to-poor-hippocampus-function-in-stanfordpackard-study.html.
74
See, e.g., OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
35TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2013, at 220 (2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2013/parts-b-c/35th-idea-arc.pdf (“[A]n
estimated one-third of students with ADHD ultimately drop[] out of high school.”).
75
See, e.g., Patricia Kerig et al., Posttraumatic Stress as a Mediator of the Relationship
Between Trauma and Mental Health Problems Among Juvenile Delinquents, 38 J. YOUTH
& ADOLESCENCE 1214, 1214-16 (2009).
76
Craig W. Colton & Ronald W. Manderscheid. Congruencies in Increased Mortality
Rates, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Causes of Death Among Public Mental Health
Clients in Eight States, PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, Apr. 2006, at 1, 2,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1563985/pdf/PCD32A42.pdf.
77
U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL
HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 150 (1999),
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBJC.pdf.
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III. TOOLS TO PROVIDE MENTAL HEALTH CARE TO UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANT CHILDREN
The tools already exist in the government’s arsenal to address the
significant risk posed by the poor mental health status of many
undocumented children: Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance
Program. Together, these programs can provide the mental health coverage
these children need.
A. Medicaid
Although the federal government had experimented with funding health
care for poor people prior to Medicaid, these early attempts gave states
extreme latitude to determine eligibility and benefits.78 According to one
scholar, the 1965 establishment of Medicaid as part of the War on Poverty
signaled a shift that prioritized the health needs of the poor over federalist
concerns.79 Thus, Medicaid requires states accepting funding to provide a
standard package of benefits.80 However, Medicaid also continues to give
states limited flexibility to set their own eligibility requirements.81 For
instance, in Maryland, children from families earning less than 317 percent
of the federal poverty line are income-eligible, while in Alabama, only
children from families earning less than 141 percent of the poverty line are
eligible.82
78

Laura D. Hermer, Federal/State Tensions in Fulfilling Medicaid’s Purpose, 21
ANNALS HEALTH L. 615, 618 (2012) (describing the Kerr-Mills Act, the predecessor to
Medicaid).
79
Id. at 618-19.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
See State Medicaid and CHIP Income Eligibility Standards, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-programinformation/program-information/downloads/medicaid-and-chip-eligibility-levelstable.pdf (last visited Nov.15, 2015) [hereinafter Medicaid Eligibility Standards]. It is
worth noting that in Alabama, children from families that earn between 141 percent of
the poverty line and 312 percent of the poverty line are income-eligible for CHIP, so in
part the distinction is whether a given state chooses to provide services to the near poor
through Medicaid or through a separate program. Id.
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Beyond the instrumental purpose of funneling federal money to “states
that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy
persons,”83 the Medicaid program also shares an aspirational goal with other
anti-poverty programs: “providing health care to the indigent in quantity
and quality equivalent to the standard of care available to the general
population.”84 The mere fact a person is undocumented does not make them
cease to be indigent and so worthy of participating in this aspirational goal.
Although states may provide additional services, minimum Medicaid
benefits include visits to doctors and psychiatrists, laboratory services,
short-term hospitalization, and, for children, Early and Periodic Screening,
Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT).85 EPSDT includes physical exams,
immunizations, vision, dental, and hearing services, as well as treatment for
conditions discovered during these screening and diagnostic procedures.86
Medicaid is “the single largest payer for mental health services in the
United States.”87 Hence, Medicaid provides children from families with low
incomes access to a range of services that would otherwise be unavailable
to them.88
B. Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
Complementing Medicaid, CHIP provides health insurance coverage to
children from families whose income exceeds Medicaid’s eligibility
83

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2009).
85
On the benefits of Medicaid for persons with mental illness, see NAT’L ALLIANCE ON
MENTAL ILLNESS, MEDICAID EXPANSION AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 2-7 (2013).
86
Early and Period Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment, MEDICAID.GOV: KEEPING
AM. HEALTHY, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Benefits/Early-and-Periodic-Screening-Diagnostic-and-Treatment.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2015).
87
Behavioral Health Services, MEDICAID.GOV: KEEPING AM. HEALTHY,
http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/benefits/mentalhealth-services.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2015).
88
See Diane Rowland & Rachel Garfield, Health Care for the Poor: Medicaid at 35, 22
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 23, 27 (2000), https://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancingReview/Downloads/00Fallpg23.pdf.
84
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threshold, but is still insufficient to allow the purchase of insurance on the
private market.89 For instance, in Illinois, only children from families with
incomes below 142 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible for
Medicaid, while children from families with incomes between 142 percent
and 313 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible for CHIP.90 Though
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) was created in 1997
in response to a health insurance marketplace somewhat different from the
one in place today under the Affordable Care Act,91 CHIP continues to be
an important safety net for children of the near poor and working poor.92
Unlike Medicaid, which provides individual entitlements, CHIP allows each
state to design its own program as either an entitlement or a discretionary
benefit.93 The greater flexibility allows states to elect to charge co-pays or
to place additional restrictions on benefits.94
C. Current Limitations on Immigrants’ Access to Medicaid and CHIP
Although the act creating Medicaid did not address the eligibility of
noncitizens, later statutes limited Medicaid’s availability.95 In 1986,
Congress amended the Medicaid statutes to restrict noncitizens’ eligibility;
89

See Janet L. Dolgin, Class Competition and American Health Care: Debating the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 70 LA. L. REV. 683, 698-708 (2010)
(providing a detailed explanation of how the program works).
90
Medicaid Eligibility Standards, supra note 82.
91
See Dolgin, supra note 89, at 698-700.
92
See Robin Rudowitz et al., Children’s Health Coverage: Medicaid, CHIP, and the
ACA, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://kff.org/healthreform/issue-brief/childrens-health-coverage-medicaid-chip-and-the-aca/.
93
See id. at 700-02. An entitlement program creates a right to participate for eligible
individuals, whereas as a discretionary benefit program allows states to cap enrollments
below the number of eligible participants. Id.
94
Rudowitz et al., supra note 92.
95
Sana Loue, Access to Health Care and the Undocumented Immigrant, 13 J. LEGAL
MED. 271, 288 (1992) [hereinafter Loue, Undocumented Immigrant]; Seo, supra note 5,
at 145-47; see also Sana Loue, Immigrant Access to Health Care and Public Health: An
International Perspective, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 213, 224-26 (2008),
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1125&context=annals
(criticizing statutory limitations on the provision of health care to international migrants).
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only “lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens and aliens permanently
residing in the states under the color of law” could participate.96 The latter
category included individuals whose presence in the United States was
known to immigration officials, but who were unlikely to face deportation.97
However, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 stripped these immigrants of eligibility,98 declaring that it is a
“compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.”99
Thus, under current law, to qualify for Medicaid or CHIP, a person must
be a citizen or a “qualified alien.”100 “Qualified aliens” include lawful
permanent residents, asylees, refugees, domestic violence victims,
humanitarian parolees, and immigrants who cannot be removed due to a
threat to the immigrant’s life or liberty in his or her country of origin.101
Most immigrants, even those lawfully present, must wait five years after
obtaining qualified status before becoming Medicaid-eligible.102 However,
in some states, pregnant women can receive a form of CHIP for prenatal

96

Loue, Undocumented Immigrant, supra note 95, at 288 (citing Act of Oct. 21, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406, 100 Stat. 1874, 2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b)).
97
See Michael K. Gusmano, Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: U.S.
Health Policy and Access to Care, UNDOCUMENTED PATIENTS: UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS & ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.undocumentedpatients.org/issuebrief/health-policy-and-access-to-care/.
98
8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2012).
99
Id. § 1601(6).
100
See id. §§ 1611(a), 1641.
101
Id. § 1641 (qualified alien definition and exceptions).
102
Id. § 1613(a) (imposing the five year residency requirement for means-tested
benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2012) (making Medicaid eligibility contingent on
family income). In some circumstances, states can offer benefits to income-eligible
“qualified aliens” before the five-year mark has arrived, provided that only state funds are
used. See AJAY CHAUDRY & KARINA FORTUNY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR
PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF
IMMIGRANTS’ ELIGIBILITY FOR SNAP, TANF, MEDICAID, AND CHIP 3-6 (2012),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/76426/ib.pdf. Additionally, certain vulnerable
immigrants such as refugees may receive Medicaid for seven years beginning upon
receipt of legal status. 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b) (2012).
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care.103 Additionally, undocumented immigrants, as well as other
immigrants who have yet to reach the five-year mark, are eligible for
emergency Medicaid services.104
This emergency Medicaid exception is quite narrow, applying only when
withholding medical treatment is reasonably likely to “result in placing the
patient’s health in serious jeopardy, serious impairment of bodily functions,
or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.”105 At a practical level,
this becomes a question of whether hospitals can be reimbursed for
providing the services,106 since the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labor Act requires any hospital with an emergency department to provide
emergency treatment regardless of a patient’s ability to pay.107

IV. ARGUMENTS FOR PROVIDING MENTAL HEALTH CARE TO
UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN THROUGH MEDICAID
Because Medicaid and CHIP are such useful tools for providing
necessary mental health care to undocumented youth, I propose two
arguments for making undocumented children eligible for these programs.
First, applying the equal protection analysis appropriate for undocumented
immigrant children found in Plyler v. Doe108 reveals a constitutional
imperative for extending the mental health care available to citizens and
permanent residents to undocumented immigrant children. Second,
extending eligibility for this benefit to undocumented children supports two
key US policies: reinforcing the conditions necessary for advancement

103

See, e.g., LA. ADMIN CODE tit. 50, pt. III, § 20301 (providing LaCHIP for pregnant
noncitizens).
104
8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (2012).
105
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)-(3) (2012).
106
Id. § 1396b; see Fruth, supra note 72, at 54-56 (discussing difficulties medical
providers face in receiving reimbursement for emergency care provided to undocumented
immigrants).
107
Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
108
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see infra Section IV(A)(1).
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based on individual merit and protecting minors’ legal entitlement to be
cared for by adults and society at large.
A. The Constitutional Argument
1. The Pr omise of Plyler v. Doe
The Equal Protection Clause applies to undocumented immigrants,
including children.109 Though equal protection is explicitly guaranteed in
the Fourteenth Amendment only, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment “contains within it the prohibition against denying to any
person the equal protection of the laws.”110 The Due Process Clause protects
all persons, even undocumented persons.111 Thus, if a federal law
distinguishing between youth with legal status and youth without such
status violates equal protection, the law must fall. A law triggers application
of the Equal Protection Clause when (1) it treats one group differently from
another group or (2) when it is adopted for the purpose of discriminating
against a certain group and impacts that group more than another group.112
If this first test is satisfied, a court then applies the requisite standard of
scrutiny to evaluate the law’s constitutionality.113 Strict scrutiny—generally
reserved for classifications based on race or national origin or for
circumstances in which fundamental rights are affected—requires that the
challenged law be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental
109
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at
214-16 (tracing the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to show that it
applies to undocumented persons as well as persons lawfully present in the state).
110
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497-500 (1954)).
111
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
112
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that a state court practice of
denying a parent custody of a child because the parent had married a person of a different
race was unconstitutional); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
113
Compare F.C.C. v. Beach Comm’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (applying rational
basis review for questions of “social and economic policy”), with Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (requiring an affirmative action program to
satisfy strict scrutiny).
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interest.114 Intermediate scrutiny—used for classifications based on gender
and nonmarital birth—requires that a challenged law be substantially related
to an important government purpose.115 Finally, the rational basis test—
used when neither a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny or a quasi-suspect
class requiring intermediate scrutiny is involved—requires only that the law
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.116
By denying income-qualified undocumented children access to mental
health services that are made available to citizens or children who have
entered the country with proper authorization, federal law clearly treats
these two groups differently. Since undocumented immigrants are neither a
suspect class nor a quasi-suspect class, strict scrutiny and intermediate
scrutiny do not apply.117 Applying rational basis review, the Supreme Court
held that requiring immigrants to have lawfully resided in the United States
for five years before receiving Medicare was not an equal protection
violation because it was reasonable to distinguish between different groups
of immigrants on the basis of duration of residency.118 By analogy, it would
seem likely that the Court would apply rational basis review to a statute that
distinguishes between authorized and unauthorized immigrants for
Medicaid eligibility purposes.
114

See, e.g., Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432-33.
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
116
See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-315 (1976) (per
curiam).
117
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated
as a suspect class, because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not
a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”). While legally-present noncitizens generally are a suspect
class, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971), the Court applies only
rational basis review when the law in question affects the democratic process, see, e.g.,
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982), or when Congress or the President has
expressly approved the discrimination, see, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 71, 81, 85
(1976). In addition, as discussed below, the Court appears to suggest that a standard
somewhat above that of ordinary rational basis, though below intermediate scrutiny,
applies when a law discriminates against undocumented children. See Plyer, 457 U.S. at
224; see infra text accompanying notes 126-28.
118
Diaz, 426 U.S. at 69, 82-83.
115
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However, when reviewing statutes affecting children, the Supreme Court
has regularly subjected them to a less deferential standard of scrutiny than it
might employ when reviewing statutes regulating the conduct of adults.119
Thus, in a series of landmark cases in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court
extended equal protection doctrine to shield children born out of wedlock
from the vindictiveness of state legislatures.120 As a result of these cases,
laws distinguishing between children based on their parents’ marital status
are now subject to intermediate scrutiny.121 Although the logic justifying
intermediate scrutiny for laws regarding so-called illegitimate children (i.e.,
that they are not responsible for their parents’ “sins”) should apply with
equal force to the noncitizen children of undocumented immigrants, the
Court, in its reluctance to increase the number of suspect and quasi-suspect
classes,122 has not taken this approach. Rather, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court
applied a somewhat heightened form of rational basis review to strike down
a Texas law that discriminated against undocumented children.123
119

See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“[W]e have invalidated
classifications that burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit
relations of their parents, because ‘visiting the condemnation on the head of an infant is
illogical and unjust.’” (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972))).
120
See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1972); Weber, 406 U.S. 164; Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). But see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)
(upholding under intermediate scrutiny a classification that only certain nonmarital
children are presumed dependent).
121
See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461-63.
122
See, e.g., Thomassson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (rejecting application of
strict scrutiny to the intellectually disabled; Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)
(rejecting application of strict scrutiny to “[c]lose relatives”); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313
(rejecting application of strict scrutiny to the elderly)) (“[B]ecause heightened scrutiny
requires an exacting investigation of legislative choices, the Supreme Court has made
clear that ‘respect for the separation of powers’ should make courts reluctant to establish
new suspect classes.”).
123
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. This heightened form is somewhat akin to the rational basis
with bite standard used by the Court in cases in which animus motivated the statute at
issue. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (animus against gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (animus
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The Texas statute at issue in Plyler withheld state per capita funds from
school districts for any students who had not been “legally admitted” into
the United States.124 To recover that lost funding, the Tyler Independent
School District imposed a “full tuition fee” on undocumented children.125
Disturbed by the implications of this law and its potentially devastating
effects not only on the children affected but also on society as a whole, the
Court altered the traditional rational basis analysis that would merely
require that a law be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.126
Instead, the Court concluded that when a statute denies services to
undocumented children and those services are needed for children to
become productive adults, that denial must further a substantial state
interest.127 To develop this heightened standard, the Court balanced the facts
that undocumented youth are not a suspect class and education is not a
fundamental right against four factors: (1) a lack of education imposes a
“lifetime hardship” on undocumented children, (2) children are not
responsible for their undocumented status, (3) children need education to be
able to participate in civic life, and (4) children need education to be able to
contribute economically.128 The greater weight of these factors justified the
Court’s heightened form of scrutiny.
To determine whether Texas had a substantial interest in denying a basic
education to undocumented children, the Plyler Court weighed the interests
the state asserted for not educating these children against the interests that

against the intellectually disabled); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
(animus against “hippies”).
124
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
125
Id. at 206 n.2.
126
See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Unless a
classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect
distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality
of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
127
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
128
Id. at 223-24.
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would accrue to society by educating them.129 Texas first argued that
because undocumented children are present in the country in violation of a
congressional scheme, it has a rational basis for denying them an
education.130 Texas further asserted interests in preserving its resources and
in deterring illegal immigration out of a concern for the state economy and
the availability of employment.131 Against these interests, the Court
weighed the significant contributions of undocumented immigrants to the
economy and their underutilization of public services.132 Because
undocumented children are not responsible for their status and because
“many of the undocumented children will remain in this country
indefinitely, and . . . some will become lawful residents or citizens of the
United States,” the Court further found that the state and the nation would
incur greater costs if these children remained illiterate and less able to
contribute to society.133 As a result, the Court concluded that Texas’s denial
of public education to undocumented children was unjustified by a
substantial interest and so failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny.134
2. Applying Plyler to Mental Health Cover age
The heightened standard applicable to the education of undocumented
children should also apply to health care. Undocumented youth are still not
a suspect class, and health care is not a fundamental right protected by the
Due Process Clause.135 However, as Plyler notes, undocumented youth are
129

See id. at 224-30.
See id. at 224-26.
131
See id. at 227-30.
132
Id. at 228.
133
Id. at 227, 230.
134
Id. at 230.
135
Cf. id. at 223. Indeed, when the Supreme Court has treated health care, it has notably
avoided analyzing health care as a freestanding right. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480 (2015) (upholding the tax premium portion of the ACA on the basis of statutory
analysis); Nat’l Federation of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (analyzing the
Affordable Care Act under the taxing power, the Spending Clause, and the Commerce
Clause); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 269-70 (applying Shapiro v.
130
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not responsible for their status.136 Moreover, poor mental health during
childhood

reduces

overall

life

outcomes,137

thereby

inhibiting

undocumented children’s ability to become productive members of
American society. To deprive undocumented youth of a service necessary
for their growth and development, the government must show that this
deprivation furthers a substantial government interest.138 Interests in
deterring unauthorized immigration and protecting scarce government
resources are not substantial when balanced against the harms inflicted on
children denied access to mental health care. Even if a court were to find
these government interests substantial, denying Medicaid coverage that
would provide mental health care to undocumented youth would not
suitably further the government’s interests.

a. Substantial Inter ests ar e Not Ser ved by Denying Mental Health
Cover age to Undocumented Youth
The two interests for denying mental health coverage to undocumented
youth that the federal government would most likely assert are the same as
those Texas asserted in Plyler: conserving resources and deterring illegal
immigration.139 There is precedent for each interest being a valid, and

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974), to hold that a duration-of-residency requirement for free medical care provided
by a county violated the right to interstate travel).
136
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223; see also Suárez-Orozco et al., supra note 18, at 440.
137
Colton & Manderscheid, supra note 76, at 7 (reporting increased rates of chronic
medical problems among persons with serious mental illness); JOE PARKS ET AL., NAT’L
ASS’N ST. MED. MENTAL HEALTH DIRECTORS, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY IN PEOPLE
WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS (2006),
http://nasmhpd.org/sites/default/files/Mortality%20and%20Morbidity%20Final%20Repo
rt%20208.18.08.pdf (“People with serious mental illness . . . die, on average, 25 years
earlier than the general population.”); see also Sarah Miller & Laura Wherry, The LongTerm Health Effects of Early Life Medicaid Coverage 4 (July 15, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mille/MillerWherry_Prenatal2014.pdf.
138
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
139
See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 420 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at
227-30.
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possibly substantial, one.140 A state’s preservation of its financial stability is
a “valid interest.”141 When treating unauthorized immigration, one court
recently suggested that states are validly concerned about “their own
resources being drained by the constant influx of illegal immigrants into
their respective territories.”142 Additionally, the federal government has a
legitimate interest in discouraging undocumented immigration.143
However, as the Court did in Plyler, these interests must be balanced
against those of the undocumented children to determine whether the
government’s interests are substantial.144 Despite the costs to the federal
government and the states in providing mental health care to undocumented
children

and

the

federal

government’s

undeniable

interest

in

disincentivizing unauthorized immigration, the balance weighs in favor of
funding mental health care for low-income undocumented children.
Providing mental health care to undocumented youth addresses the potential
trauma of their experience and reduces the impact that trauma will have on

140

See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984) (finding that “deterring
unauthorized immigration” is as important a Congressional objective as ensuring fair
labor practices); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (“We recognize that a
State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs.”), overruled in
part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
141
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633.
142
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 672 (S.D. Tex.) (holding that Texas had
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of whether the Deferred
Action for Parents of Childhood Arrivals (DAPA) program and an expansion of the
DACA program were subject to notice and comment under the APA), stay denied by 787
F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) and aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). But cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376
(1971) (holding that, in the context of legal immigration, the “justification of limiting
expenses is particularly inappropriate and unreasonable when the discriminated class
consists of aliens” (quoting Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1970))).
143
Cf. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903 (finding that “deterring unauthorized immigration” is as
important a Congressional objective as ensuring fair labor practices); see also LeClerc,
419 F.3d at 420 (suggesting that states have a valid interest in deterring illegal
immigration).
144
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224-30; see supra text accompanying notes 129-34.
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their subsequent physical and mental health.145 A healthy and mentally
stable population is more prepared to engage with civil society.146
Moreover, since unaddressed mental health needs all too frequently lead to
extended (and therefore expensive) contacts with the criminal justice system
in the form of pre-trial detentions and incarcerations,147 society’s interest in
a smoothly functioning criminal justice system designed to isolate criminals
is ill-served when many of those “criminals” are simply mentally ill
individuals swept up in that system.148 Finally, because individuals with
unaddressed mental health needs often lead impoverished and unstable
lives,149 these individuals utilize emergency social services (e.g., crisis
145
See, e.g., Stephanie J. Dallam, The Long-Term Medical Consequences of Childhood
Trauma, in THE COST OF CHILDHOOD MALTREATMENT: WHO PAYS? WE ALL DO (K.
Franey et al. eds., 2001), http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/res/dallam/4.html
(describing the medical consequences of childhood trauma).
146
M. David Low et al., Can Education Policy be Health Policy? Implications of
Research on the Social Determinants of Health, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1131,
1147 (2005).
147
In 2006, the Bureau of Justice Statistics concluded that over half of all inmates in
prisons and jails had some sort of mental health problem. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E.
GLAZE, BUREAU JUST. STAT., MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES 1 (2006). The percentage of inmates with mental health problems was higher in
jails than in prisons, reflecting the role of jails as pre-trial detention facilities for those
unable to make bail as well as temporary detention facilities for the mentally ill pending
transfer to mental health facilities. See id. at 3. Given that only a third of state prisoners
and only 17 percent of jail inmates received mental health treatment while incarcerated,
see id. at 9, the criminal justice system is not providing the services needed by its
population, see Christine M. Sarteschi, Mentally Ill Offenders Involved with the Criminal
Justice System: A Synthesis, SAGE OPEN, July-Sept. 2003, at 1 (collecting the results of
various studies).
148
Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses:
The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 U.D.C. L. REV. 143, 160 (2003)
(“No rational purpose is served by the current system. Public safety is not protected when
people who have mental illnesses are needlessly arrested for nuisance crimes or when the
mental illness at the root of a criminal act is exacerbated by a system designed for
punishment, not treatment.”); see generally KIDEUK KIM ET AL., URBAN INST., THE
PROCESSING AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publicationpdfs/2000173-The-Processing-and-Treatment-of-Mentally-Ill-Persons-in-the-CriminalJustice-System.pdf.
149
See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
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services, soup kitchens, and homeless shelters) at a higher rate than do
individuals without these unaddressed needs.150 Because undocumented
immigrants remain eligible for these emergency services,151 society will
continue to pay a substantial cost for its failure to provide undocumented
children with the mental health services necessary to enable them to lead
stable and productive adult lives.
Hence, while the federal government can articulate some legitimate
reasons for denying Medicaid to undocumented children, when balanced
against the long-term benefits to our communities and our public health
budgets that will proceed from providing mental health services through
Medicaid to these children, these interests do not reach the threshold of
“substantial.”

b. Even Assuming that the Gover nment’s Inter ests ar e Substantial,
Denying Medicaid to Undocumented Youth May Not Fur ther Those
Inter ests.
Under the Plyler standard, a law depriving undocumented youth of vital
services cannot be “rational unless it furthers some substantial goal.”152
Because the government’s interest here is not substantial, it is unnecessary
to ask whether the denial of Medicaid payments for mental health care
furthers that interest. However, assuming that the government’s asserted
interest is substantial, it remains uncertain whether such a law suitably
furthers interests in deterring unauthorized immigration or conserving fiscal
resources. Although denying mental health care to undocumented children
will clearly save money in the short term, there is no guarantee that
unaddressed mental health needs will not lead to greater utilization of
150
See, e.g., Current Statistics on the Prevalence and Characteristics of People
Experiencing Homelessness in the United States, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 2, 5-6, 8,
http://homeless.samhsa.gov/ResourceFiles/hrc_factsheet.pdf (last updated July 2011).
151
8 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(2)(G) (2012); see infra Section IV(A)(2)(b).
152
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
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medical, psychiatric, and social services as mental health crises worsen.
Furthermore, the denial of government-supported mental health care to
undocumented

children

only

deters

unauthorized

immigration

if

undocumented adults weigh the unavailability of these services for their
children when deciding whether to immigrate. However, there is no
evidence that undocumented adults are either leaving their children in their
country of origin or electing not to immigrate as a result of the denial of
mental health services to undocumented children in the United States.153
Their children may not have access to mental health care in their country of
origin, so immigrating would produce no net change in a family’s access to
mental health service. Moreover, the reduction in stress as a result of the
potentially greater family income available in the United States may be
more valuable from a mental health standpoint than access to mental health
professionals.154 Finally, because misinformation about the legal status of
immigrant children in the United States is common,155 parents in countries
of origin may incorrectly assume that care will be available for their
children.
3. Addr essing Counter ar guments
Applying the heightened Plyler standard is critical because under rational
basis review, a court would likely find that denying Medicaid or CHIP to
undocumented immigrant children is rationally related to the government’s
153

See Emily Ryo, Deciding to Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration,
78 AM. SOC. REV. 574, 592 (2013) (indicating as a result of a statistical study of
individuals in Mexico that the main variables considered by prospective migrants are
“perceived availability of jobs in Mexico, . . . perceived dangers of crossing the border, . .
. belief that disobeying the law is sometimes justified, . . . belief that it is okay to migrate
illegally in search of economic opportunities beyond basic survival, . . . belief that
Mexicans have a right to be in the United States without the U.S. government’s
permission, and . . . perception that family and friends have tried to migrate illegally.”).
154
See Jitender Sareen et al., Relationship Between Household Income and Mental
Disorders, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 419, 422-23 (2011) (finding a correlation
between lower income levels and increased incidence of mental illness and suicide in a
large-scale population study).
155
See Rempell, supra note 11, at 381-83.
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legitimate interests. For instance, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
emphasized that under rational basis review “Texas’s legitimate interests—
conservation of budget resources and deterrence of illegal immigration—
probably would have been sufficient to justify the state’s decision [in
Plyler] to deny state benefits to illegal entrants and their children.”156 This
pronouncement strongly suggests that under ordinary rational basis review,
the federal government’s decision to limit undocumented persons to
emergency Medicaid only does not violate equal protection. Conserving
resources and deterring unauthorized entry are both legitimate objectives;
moreover, “undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper legislative
goal.”157 Under rational basis review, “legislative choice . . . may be based
on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”158 Thus,
a court might uphold the denial of Medicaid since it is conceivable that
present savings may be more valuable or that immigrants might consider the
availability of mental health care for their children.

Hence, some

heightened form of review is required if a court is to find denial of
Medicaid to undocumented youth to be unconstitutional.
This section will address three potential counterarguments that could be
raised in opposition to applying the Plyler standard to the denial of
Medicaid services to undocumented youth. First, because the law at issue
concerns immigration, an area of legislation for which the federal
government has unique responsibility,159 the Fourteenth Amendment
analysis conducted by the Court in Plyler may not apply. Second, the most
pressing needs of undocumented immigrant children may already be
protected by the availability of emergency Medicaid and crisis services.
Third, Congress has expressed a clear intention to deny certain benefits to

156

LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 420 (5th Cir. 2005) (discussing Plyler).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
158
F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
159
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (“The National Government has
significant power to regulate immigration. With power comes responsibility . . . .”).
157
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undocumented immigrants, a factor absent in the circumstances analyzed by
the Plyler Court.

a. Does the Plyler Standar d Constr ain the Feder al Gover nment or only
the States?
First, Plyler was decided under the Fourteenth Amendment.160 On its
face, the decision constrains only the states, not the federal government.161
So arguably, the federal government, due to its unique responsibility for
immigration, should only have to satisfy ordinary rational basis review.162
However, Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence applies to the federal
government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.163
Moreover, even if the Plyler holding itself applies only to state laws, the
humanitarian justification behind the decision applies with equal force here
and militates heavily in favor of extending Plyler’s heightened scrutiny to
the ban on providing Medicaid to undocumented children. The Plyler Court
found that undocumented youth are “special” and “not comparably situated”
to undocumented adults.164 Whether given legislation is state or federal does
not affect the inability of children to choose to “remove themselves” from
the United States.165 Hence, the Plyler standard should also restrain the
federal government when its laws exclude undocumented youth from
receiving essential services.
160

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that an Arizona
statute imposing a residency duration requirement on immigrants before they can receive
welfare is unconstitutional) with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1976)
(interpreting Graham narrowly and finding that the federal government can impose
duration of residency requirements for welfare benefits).
162
See Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004); Doe v. Comm’r of
Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Mass. 2002) (“Courts apply the rational
basis standard in these circumstances because of the scope and nature of congressional
authority to regulate immigration.”).
163
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497-500 (1954)).
164
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20.
165
Id.
161
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b. Is Emer gency Mental Health Car e Sufficient?
Second, because current Medicaid regulations allow undocumented
immigrants to access emergency care, some provision has been made for
immigrants’ mental health needs.166 This is thus distinguishable from the
complete exclusion from education that motivated the court to craft the
heightened scrutiny standard in Plyler.167 Moreover, the Department of
Justice has interpreted the prohibition on providing federal and state
benefits to undocumented immigrants to exclude “crisis counseling and
intervention” and “mental health . . . assistance necessary to protect life or
safety.”168 One could argue that these provisions suffice to protect
undocumented children.
At the outset, it is unclear whether the emergency provision covers
mental health treatment. On its face, the emergency provision applies only
to situations where a patient’s health is in “serious jeopardy” or there is a
reasonable expectation of “serious impairment to bodily functions” or
“serious dysfunction of . . . bodily organ[s].”169 Even if urgent mental health
needs to cope with a crisis might be construed to fall under the “serious
jeopardy” provision, treatment of an ongoing mental health problem, no
matter how severe, seems unlikely to qualify as an emergency under these
definitions.
In addition, the Department of Justice has interpreted the emergency
services provision to allow undocumented immigrants to access
community-based services when necessary to protect “life or safety.”170
Under this interpretation undocumented immigrants could access services
166

8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (2012).
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-23.
168
Final Specification of Community Programs Necessary for Protection of Life or Safety
Under Welfare Reform Legislation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3613-02 (Jan. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Specification of Community Programs] (interpreting 8 U.S.C § 1613(c)(2)(G) (2012)).
169
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3) (2012) (defining “emergency medical condition”).
170
8 U.S.C § 1613(c)(2)(G) (2012) (requiring as well that the services not be meanstested).
167
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necessary to prevent a death from drug overdose or suicide, for instance.
While this dispensation suggests some space for some mental health
services for undocumented children, the “life or safety” rationale suggests
that the services envisioned are crisis services, not the sort of sustained
mental health treatment necessary to support quality of life. Moreover, even
though this interpretation specifically allows “treatment of mental illness”
to continue irrespective of immigration status, this can only occur in
settings where no means testing is performed.171 Since this requirement
eliminates the possibility of using a sliding-scale fee arrangement, the
interpretation excludes many established clinics and other service
providers,172 as well as most providers of psychiatric services (as opposed to
counseling services more generally).173 This requirement thus limits the
scope of this potential exception to the blanket ban on government services
to undocumented immigrants.
Finally, encouraging people to wait until their mental health deteriorates
such that they require emergency care may be financially irresponsible
given the high cost and lack of availability of emergency inpatient mental
health care.174 Undocumented children’s mental health needs are higher

171
Specification of Community Programs, supra note 168 (mentioning in the discussion
of comments prior to the specification that sliding-scale arrangements would not fall
under the exception provided by Congress); see also 8 U.S.C § 1613(c)(2)(G) (2012)
(requiring that the services “not condition the provision of assistance, the amount of
assistance provided, or the cost of assistance provided on the individual recipient’s
income or resources”).
172
Specification of Community Programs, supra note 168.
173
The funding model of psychiatric services for low-income populations typically relies
upon Medicaid (a means-tested program) or upon sliding-scale arrangements. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 254g(b)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring that community clinics using National
Health Services Corps members operate on a sliding-scale fee arrangement unless a
particular patient is covered by Medicaid, Medicare, or CHIP).
174
See, e.g., Ashley Stone et al., Impact of the Mental Healthcare Delivery System on
California Emergency Departments, 12 W.J. EMERGENCY MED. 51 (2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3298229/pdf/wjem-13-01-51.pdf
(reporting a lack of inpatient psychiatric beds into which to transfer psychiatric patients
who appear in emergency departments).
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than those of other children.175 Undocumented youth suffer significant
trauma due to the hazards of crossing the border, the fear of deportation,
and the disruption to family bonds occasioned by forced separation.176
Allowing children to grow up with unaddressed trauma affects their
neurological development, impairing their ability to learn and to adjust
socially.177 The consequences of failing to address children’s mental health
needs are as dire as the consequences of failing to address children's
physical health needs. Just as the prevention of illiteracy, which imposes a
lifetime handicap upon children denied an education, is an “interest [that],
though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special place in
equal protection analysis,”178 treatment of mental illness that can impair a
child’s life prospects is entitled to similar solicitude. Society does not
benefit from having an underclass of the unwell. Because emergency and
crisis services are insufficient to address the urgent mental health needs of
undocumented children, their availability does not justifying refusing to
apply the Plyler standard.

c. Can Congr essional Intent to Deny Benefits J ustify Unequal
Tr eatment of Undocumented Youth?
Third, the Plyler decision relied upon the Court not wishing to impute to
Congress the intent to deny an education to undocumented youth.179
However, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996

175

See supra Section II.
Undocumented Americans, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/topics/immigration/undocumented-video.aspx (last visited July 24,
2015).
177
Bruce Perry & Ronnie Pollard, Homeostasis, Stress, Trauma and Adaptation: A
Neurodevelopmental View of Childhood Trauma, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM. 33 (1998).
178
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34, n.74, 35, n.78 (1973)).
179
Id. at 226 (majority opinion).
176
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offers a clear expression of precisely such an intent.180 The Act defines
“qualified alien” so as to exclude undocumented immigrants181 and
specifically forbids providing non-emergency health benefits to nonqualified aliens.182 Given this clear intent, it may be that Plyler does not
apply and that ordinary rational basis review is appropriate. However,
Congress cannot violate equal protection, even if it does so intentionally.183
Even if Congress could do so, the undocumented children affected by its
decision did not choose their current situation. The law imputes less
culpability and capacity to juveniles.184 Given minors’ special position,
Plyler’s stricter “substantial interest” standard is still appropriate.185
Because denying mental health care to undocumented children fails review
under that standard, the government should immediately remove barriers to
Medicaid and CHIP for these children.
B. Policy Arguments
In addition to constitutional arguments in favor of extending Medicaid
and CHIP mental health coverage to undocumented youth, two policy
arguments weigh heavily in favor of increased coverage. First, because
mental health plays such a critical role in an individual’s ability to reach his
or her full potential, access to mental health care is required in order to
provide children with equality of opportunity. Second, minors—particularly
undocumented children—are limited in their ability to provide themselves
180
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, §§ 401, 411, 431
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621, 1641 (2012)).
181
8 U.S.C. § 1641 (2012).
182
Id. § 1611 (federal benefits); id. § 1621 (state benefits).
183
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (“[T]hough Congress has
great authority to design laws to fit its own conception of sound national policy, it cannot
deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
184
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1918 (2008) (“All natural persons have capacity to
contract, except unemancipated minors . . . .”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67-69
(2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-73 (2005)) (holding that minors
have reduced criminal culpability).
185
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
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with the necessities of life. Thus, the state must intervene to ensure that
undocumented youth are provided with these necessities. These policy
arguments may provide motivation for legislatures and the courts to expand
mental health coverage for low-income undocumented children.186
1. Equality of Oppor tunity
Equal opportunity is a foundational principle of American society.187 The
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment devised the Equal Protection Clause
to abolish “governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to
advancement on the basis of individual merit.”188 Likewise, Congress has
structured the meritocratic federal employment system to “assure[] that all
receive equal opportunity.”189 Where there is equal opportunity, every child

186

Human rights law also positions health care as a fundamental right. See, e.g.,
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24. Some scholars have suggested that human
rights thus provide a powerful argument for extending health care benefits to
undocumented persons generally, and undocumented children in particular. See, e.g.,
Berta Hernández-Truyola & Justin Luna, Children and Immigration: International,
Local, and Social Responsibilities, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 312 (2006) (“Human
rights ideals are the foundation for establishing state health care as a fundamental right.”);
Puneet K. Sandhu, Comment, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can the United States
Learn from Foreign Models of Health Rights Jurisprudence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1151
(2007) (arguing that international examples demonstrate both the moral and social utility
of a legal right to health care as well as the fact that “a right to health care need not raise
troubling justiciability concerns”). However, given the reluctance of federal courts and
legislatures to embrace principles of international law, for instance, by refusing to ratify
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this Article will not address such arguments in
further detail.
187
As a factual matter, it is also clear that the equal opportunity envisioned during the
Republican period did not extend to all people. Women were routinely denied the right to
civic participation, while black people were subjected to the inhumanity of slavery.
Nevertheless, equal opportunity as an ideal provides a potential avenue to create support
for the expansion of the welfare state among critics for whom that expansion cannot be
justified by purely humanitarian concerns.
188
Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 at 221-22 (“[D]enial of education to some isolated group of
children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition
of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis
of individual merit.”).
189
5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(1) (2012).
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ostensibly has an equal chance to advance based on his or her own merits.190
As a result, equal opportunity prevents the creation of a “discrete and
permanent underclass.”191 However, by solidifying the negative effects of
untreated trauma and transforming those deleterious effects into potentially
debilitating mental illnesses that lead to personal and social instability, the
denial of mental health care to undocumented children creates precisely
such an underclass.192
Without major structural changes to American society, substantial
economic and social inequality will continue. Equal opportunity provides a
moral justification for unequal outcomes.193 A political and social
commitment to a meritocracy thus requires an equally strong commitment
to ensuring that the circumstances into which one was born do not
determine the outcome of one’s life.
A lack of health care generally, and a lack of mental health care
specifically, render children unequal in their opportunities to advance on
their merits. Research consistently demonstrates that children without
access to health care have reduced life outcomes across a range of
metrics.194 Congress has implicitly recognized the equivalence of the
suffering caused by mental and physical conditions by requiring that
employer-provided health care treat mental health and physical health

190

Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 470 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
192
See also Suárez-Orozco et al., supra note 18, at 465 (“Permanently encircling millions
of children and youth behind a barbed wire of liminality is counter to fundamental
democratic ideals, the values we share as Americans, and the core tenets of our
civilization.”).
193
See generally Sandhu, supra note 186.
194
See Janet Currie & Nancy Reichman, Policies to Promote Child Health: Introducing
the Issue, FUTURE CHILD., Spring 2015, at 3, 3 (“A large volume of high-quality research
shows that unhealthy children grow up to be unhealthy adults, that poor health and low
income go hand in hand, and that the consequences of both poverty and poor health make
large demands on public coffers.”).
191
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comparably.195 Recent Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services
regulations make similar parity provisions applicable to all state Medicaid
and CHIP programs, regardless of the specific mechanism through which
services are delivered.196 As a result, poor children now have expanded
access to mental health services.197 If citizen children from low-income
families have such access, it would seem a monumental denial of equal
opportunity to exclude immigrant children.
The absence of mental health treatment leads to an increased risk of
chronic mental health problems.

198

Children thus afflicted may need to

devote time and resources throughout their lives to managing their
illnesses—time and resources that could otherwise be spent on activities
geared towards social and economic advancement. Moreover, children with
serious mental illnesses are much less likely to graduate from high
school,199 let alone earn the college diploma or technical degree that is
increasingly necessary for success in the American economy.200 Just like the
constitutional imperative to provide equal education to undocumented
195
29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012). Notably, however, this provision does not mandate that
employer-provided health care include mental health coverage; it only mandates that if a
plan did cover mental health, it must not impose greater restrictions than for physical
health care. Nevertheless, since most health care plans offer some mental health
coverage, these parity provisions are improving access to mental health treatment. See
infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
196
Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program; Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008; the Application of Mental Health Parity Requirements to
Coverage Offered by Medicaid Managed Care Organizations, the Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP), and Alternative Benefit Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 18389 (Mar. 30,
2016).
197
See id.
198
See, e.g., Kerig et al., supra note 75, at 1214-16.
199
Nicholas Freudenberg & Jessica Ruglis, Reframing School Dropout as a Public
Health Issue, PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, Oct. 2007, at 1,
https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2007/oct/pdf/07_0063.pdf.
200
ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, GEORGETOWN PUB. POLICY INST., RECOVERY: JOB
GROWTH AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS THROUGH 2020, at 15 fig.4 (2013),
https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Recovery2020.FR_.Web_.pdf
(“By 2020, 65 percent of all jobs will require postsecondary education and training, up
from 28 percent in 1973.”).
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children,201 a similar imperative exists to provide the mental health services
that would enable those children to meaningfully access that education. The
evidence suggests that providing mental health care to children can alter the
trajectory of their lives, positioning them so that they, like their healthy
peers, can achieve their goals.202
As the Plyler Court recognized more than 30 years ago, undocumented
children are likely to remain in the United States.203 Unaccompanied
children who arrived during the surge are ineligible for DACA and its
pathway to authorized status.204 However, some children may be eligible for
asylee status205 or for visas for victims of crime, abuse, or neglect.206 By
impairing the future prospects of children who remain in the United States,
this denial of equal opportunity produces negative consequences for
American society. Having an underclass of the mentally ill not only
increases health care costs generally,207 it also leads to increased criminal
justice expenditures.208 More importantly, denying mental health care to
201

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that because a state offers free public
education to other children, it must offer that education to undocumented children as
well).
202
OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, INTEGRATED CMTY. SERVS. FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, SCHOOL AND MENTAL HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS (2015),
https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/Childservice/docs/school-based-mhservices.pdf
(arguing for expanding access to mental health services through schools in order to
promote school engagement and educational success).
203
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
204
For a further discussion of the DACA program, see supra note 22.
205
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (offering asylum to individuals who can “establish that race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or
will be at least one central reason for [their] persecut[ion]”).
206
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (stating requirements for visas for human trafficking
victims); id. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (stating requirements for visas for certain crime victims);
id. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (stating requirements for visas for abused, neglected, or abandoned
children).
207
See Colton & Manderscheid, supra note 76, at 2.
208
Spending Money in All the Wrong Places: Jails and Prisons, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR
MENTAL ILLNESS (Mar. 2004),
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/1176392/18407948/1337955233993/2007071
(collecting statistics demonstrating that a substantial percentage of the incarcerated

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

For the Least of These Brothers and Sisters of Mine...

undocumented children betrays the American value of equal opportunity
constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.209 In light of this value,
children must have a right to the resources necessary to ensure that
accidents of birth do not create lifetime impediments. Some would argue
that a right to health care, as a positive right, is inconsistent with the
negative rights enshrined in the Constitution—the right to be free from
government intrusion.210 But the right to be left alone means little if one is
left inside a personal hell.
2. Pr otection of Minor s
As minors, undocumented youth are entitled to have someone provide
them with healthcare. Current federal law deprives undocumented children
of the right to any form of non-emergency and non-crisis mental health
care.211 However, if an undocumented child is in ORR custody, which must
provide mental health care to children in its custody, that child acquires a
right to health care as a result of the custodial relationship.212
The source of this obligation is the common-law principle that by
confining a person, the government has taken away that person’s ability to
obtain the necessities of life for himself or herself; thus, the government

population is mentally ill and that a substantial percentage of mentally ill Americans will
interact with the criminal justice system).
209
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22.
210
See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2-4 (1990).
211
See supra Section III(C).
212
See Office of Refugee Resettlement, Children Entering the United States
Unaccompanied: Section 3 (Services), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 20,
2015), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/children-entering-the-united-statesunaccompanied-section-3 (requiring individual care providers to provide “appropriate
mental health interventions” by “licensed mental health professional[s]”). State-run
childcare institutions are “not constitutionally required to be funded at such a level as to
provide . . . the best health care available.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1992). The
corollary is that they are required to provide an adequate level of health care to the child
in custody.
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must shoulder that obligation.213 The Supreme Court has explicitly adopted
this principle with regard to prisoners214 and inmates of state mental
institutions.215 Thus, the Court has recognized that those subject to custodial
relationships have a right to be provided with basic necessities.216 Health
care is a “basic necessity of life.”217 When the government prevents a
person from obtaining aid, it creates “total dependency on the state for
treatment,” which the state must then provide.218
Given that they are unable to provide for themselves due to legal and
practical restrictions,219 undocumented children have neither the opportunity
nor the obligation to provide themselves with the necessities of life. As a
result, that obligation must fall upon someone else. Parents are the initial
obligors.220 If parents are unable to provide for their children, state
governments, with federal encouragement, have created foster care systems
that channel funding to foster parents who agree to raise those children.221
213

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (“[I]t is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty,
care for himself.” (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926))).
214
Id.
215
Youngstown v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (“[R]espondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care.”).
216
See id.; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.
217
Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) (quoting DEP’T OF HEALTH,
EDUC., & WELFARE, MEDICAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS 74 (1961)).
218
Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1329-30 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[T]here has been a
proliferation of decisions in which the fact that incarceration disables an inmate from
procuring aid has been and creates total dependency upon the state for treatment has been
seized upon as a justification for judicial scrutiny of prison medical prisons.”).
219
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(l), 212, 213(c) (2012) (restricting employment of minors);
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (2012) (criminalizing the hiring of undocumented workers).
220
See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 101 (2014) (“[P]arents have the responsibility
for providing the basic necessities of life.”).
221
See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2012) (requiring states to make “foster care maintenance
payments” in order to be eligible for federal funding); see, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. §
36:477(B)(1) (Supp. 2015) (“The office shall provide for the public child welfare
functions of the state, including . . . meeting [foster children’s] daily maintenance needs
of food, shelter, clothing, necessary physical medical services, school supplies, and
incidental personal needs . . . .”).
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Thus, the federal government has already recognized and embraced an
obligation to provide children qua children with the basic necessities of life.
Since this obligation emerges from a child’s legal status as a minor, rather
than from a child’s immigration status, it follows that an undocumented
child is entitled to mental health care through Medicaid or CHIP. While the
federal government has already recognized this obligation for children in
ORR custody,222 since the obligation to provide mental health care for
undocumented children does not proceed solely from the custodial
arrangement, but rather exists by analogy with the custodial arrangement,
the fact that most undocumented children are not in the government’s
custody does not lift this obligation.223 Rather, by preventing undocumented
children from procuring the necessities of life,224 the government has
obligated itself to ensure that those children are provided for. While one
could argue that this obligation should fall upon undocumented children’s
parents, they may not be present in the country. Moreover, even if they are,
they may be undocumented and thus limited in their ability to provide for
their children due to work restrictions on undocumented immigrants.225
Given that the government has created the conditions in which
undocumented children are unable to obtain the necessities of life, the
government has imposed upon itself the obligation to provide these
necessities, including mental health care.
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See Office of Refugee Resettlement, supra note 212.
Stinchcomb & Hershberg, supra note 14, at 29 (reporting that 85 percent of
unaccompanied children are placed with a sponsor); Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman,
Dramatic Surge in the Arrival of Unaccompanied Children Has Deep Roots and No
Simple Solutions, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 13, 2014),
http://migrationpolicy.org/article/dramatic-surge-arrival-unaccompanied-children-hasdeep-roots-and-no-simple-solutions (reporting a 90 percent placement rate).
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See supra note 219.
225
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (2012).
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V. CONCLUSION
Children who enter the United States without proper authorization,
particularly those who make the perilous journey to the United States alone,
are in the midst of a mental health crisis.226 If left unaddressed, the complex
trauma that these children have experienced will manifest in severe mental
illnesses that will strain already overtaxed mental health and criminal
justice systems while robbing these children of their futures.227 The
programs already exist to treat these illnesses, but federal law currently
denies undocumented children access to them.228
Denying undocumented children access to Medicaid and CHIP not only
violates equal protection under the Plyler standard, it also flies in the face of
American ideals of equal opportunity and the sanctity of childhood.
Providing adequate mental health care to undocumented children removes
one obstacle to their ability to participate equally in the social, economic,
and civic life of their adopted country. Moreover, all children, whether
undocumented or not, have neither the legal right nor the legal
responsibility to provide themselves with the necessities of life. When a
government prevents children from providing themselves with the
necessities of life, it obligates itself to ensure that children receive the
necessary care. That care includes appropriate mental health treatment.
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See supra Section II.
See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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See supra Section III(C).
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